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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brunet argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record 
on appeal with various transcripts. Mr. Brunet argues that the requested transcripts are 
necessary for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the 
prior proceedings when it decided to relinquished jurisdiction. In response, based on 
the new standard of review articulated in State v. Morgan, 2012 Opinion No. 38 
(Ct. App. July 10, 2012), the State argues that the only relevant transcripts are those 
from final probation admission hearing, the probation revocation hearing, and the rider 
review hearing. 
This brief is necessary to address the Morgan opinion and the State's assertion 
that only the transcripts of the final probation admission hearing, the probation 
revocation hearing, and the rider review are relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Mr. Brunet argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district court 
can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it considers whether to 
revoke probation or reduce a sentence. The State asserts that this argument is based 
on "gross speculation that the district court 'may' have considered information" from the 
requested hearings when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction. The State's position 
ignores the applicable standard of review. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an 
independent review of the entire record when determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion in regard to a probation/sentencing determination, what the district 
court actually considered is generally irrelevant, under this standard of review. The only 
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questions are: whether the information at issue was before the district court, and 
whether that information is relevant to the probation/sentencing issues on appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Brunet's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Brunet due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?1 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brunet's oral l.C.R. 
35 motion requesting leniency? 
1 Issues II and Ill will not addressed in this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
--~' ---
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Brunet Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessaiy Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making 
sentencing decisions. Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho 
appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive 
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record 
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in 
regard to a sentencing/probation determination. In other words, the question on appeal 
generally does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead, 
the central question is whether the record before the district court supports its 
sentencing/probation determination. 
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was 
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing 
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of 
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of 
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which 
occurred years before the disposition of the issue on appeal and were never discussed 
by the district court. 
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8. In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Has 
The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's Brief 
1. The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Costin's Appeal 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brunet argued, for the first time in this appeal, that 
the denial of his request for the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process and equal protections clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) In response the 
State argued, based on State v. Morgan, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10, 2012), 
that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address Mr. Brunet's due 
process argument because it would be tantamount to entertaining an appeal from the 
Supreme Court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 9.) The State went on to implicitly argue 
that Mr. Brunet should file a renewed motion to augment with the Court of Appeals in 
the event this case is assigned to that court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 9.) Contrary 
to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule 
on the merits of all cases to which it is assigned by the Supreme Court. The relevant 
portions of l.A.R. 108 state as follows: 
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and 
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the 
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases: 
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; 
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in 
criminal cases; 
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission; 
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission; 
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(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar; 
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council. 
(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall into any of 
the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to address the 
issues raised in his Appellant's Brief. 
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an 
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Brunet's claims 
about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the 
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Brunet's due process issue when it 
makes its decision to either keep this appeal of assign it to the Court of Appeals. This 
position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Specifically, l.R.S.C. 
21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language of l.R.S.C. 21 follows: 
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the 
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the 
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to 
reconsider the assignment. 
Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing 
and circulated to all the justices. 
At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be 
taken up at conference. 
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the Rule, it is a 
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input 
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court will be aware of Mr. Brunet's due process and equal protection arguments when it 
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makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of Appeals. 
In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court will be 
implicitly granting the Court of Appeals authority to address the merits of Mr. Brunet's 
claims of error. 
Additionally, the State implicitly asserted that Mr. Brunet should file a renewed 
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 9.) This assertion is 
without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be 
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
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(emphasis added). Mr. Brunet is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an 
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110 
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Brunet could 
file a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues 
addressed in that appeal. Even though Mr. Brunet is challenging the constitutionality of 
the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts, an assignment of 
this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of authority from the 
Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's Brief. 
2. An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With l\lo Authority 
To Address Mr. Brunet's Claims Of Error Will Violate His Right To 
Procedural Due Process On Appeal 
In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals 
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of 
the issues Mr. Brunet's raised in his Appellant's Brief, he argues, in the alternative, that 
will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, which guarantee him 
a fair appeal. The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee 
a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. 
art.1§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
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process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Deparlment of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 
(1996)). 
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court 
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the 
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. l!linois 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In Idaho, 
a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See l.C. § 19-2801. 
Additionally, an appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as 
defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction} 
may appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 
754 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In this case, Mr. Brunet argues that due process protections apply to every stage 
of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Even though Mr. Brunet does not have an independent right 
to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can challenge the 
constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his appeal and 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures affecting his 
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appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of the Supreme 
Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will occur because 
the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Brunet from any state procedure by which 
he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the denial of his motion to 
augment. 
C. The Morgan Decision Is In Conflict With Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
The State also argues that the requested transcripts are not relevant under the 
standard of review articled in Morgan. However, the Morgan opinion changed the prior 
standard of review in a manner which is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In 
1986, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed an alleged due process violation during a 
probation revocation proceeding. State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). One of the 
issues in that case involved the district court's reconsideration of evidence concerning 
events that had occurred prior to the alleged probation violation. Id. at 153. Chapman 
wanted to limit the district court's review to "only evidence subsequent to the original 
probation decision." Id. (emphasis in the original). The Idaho Supreme Court rejected 
that idea and stated, "[vjery little information about a defendant will be irrelevant to the 
effort of the law to individualize treatment of convicted persons." Id. (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). The Chapman Court noted that "[p]recluding consideration 
of Chapman's conduct prior to his being placed on probation would unwisely skew the 
trial court's consideration of the necessary facts which the court needs in order to 
properly individualize its decision vis-a-vis him." Id. Then, relying on State v. 
Trowbridge, 95 Idaho 640 (1973), the Chapman Court identified a number of factors the 
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district court must consider when determining whether to continue a person on 
probation. Id. at 153-54. The Chapman Court also noted that a decision to place a 
person on probation is not the same as a finding that a person is capable of 
rehabilitation; instead, probation is a tool that the State may use to combat recidivism. 
Id. at 154. The Court then identified a number of other factors the district court must 
consider when making the decision of whether to continue with probation after it has 
found a probation violation. Id. 
More recently in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court was specifically asked to 
resolve the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when revoking 
probation and ordering a suspended sentence into execution. State v. Pierce, 150 
Idaho 1 (2010). Pierce argued that the sentence the district court executed was 
excessive in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his case. Id. at 5-6. Before 
reviewing the relevant facts, the Court noted that the "standard of review of a criminal 
sentence is also well-established" and that the "Court conducts an independent review 
of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing." Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has never directly answered the question of 
the scope of appellate review in jurisdictional relinquishment/probation revocation 
proceedings, it has clearly indicated that the proper standard for the district court's 
determination of what consequences should be passed on to an individual after finding 
a violation of probation is review of the entire record. The Morgan Court's decision to 
adopt a different standard of review appears to be in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent. 
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D. The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Provides Little Guidance To 
Counsel When Counsel Is Determining Which Transcripts Will Be Necessary For 
An Appeal 
The State argues that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal 
in reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.58.) However, the Morgan standard of review provides little guidance for counsel 
and, therefore, counsel must still request all of transcripts to provide for a meaningful 
appeal and to prevent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Court of Appeals' prior standard of review was articulated in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho (Ct. App. 2009). In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
resolved an ongoing dispute about the proper standard of review in probation revocation 
cases. Id. at Relying on State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), 
and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to 
only facts that had arisen between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the 
revocation proceedings. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position 
would have eliminated any need for appellate courts to review the change of plea 
hearing transcript, the sentencing transcript, and the presentence report because all of 
that information would have been available to the district court prior to the original 
sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington argued that the proper standard of review 
should include a review of "all facts existing both at the time of the original sentence and 
at the time the sentence is ordered into execution," relying on the standard established 
in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of 
Appeals agreed with Hanington and held: 
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review 
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited 
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Id. 
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and 
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we 
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation. 
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to 
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the 
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal. 
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking once again to 
State v. Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the 
entire record when reviewing the executed sentence: 
[WJhen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant files an appeal from 
an order revoking probation/relinquishing jurisdiction the applicable standard of review 
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requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred 
prior to, as well as the events which occurred during, the probation revocation 
proceedings. The basis for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally and quite 
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision." Id. The Court of Appeals then stated that, "When reviewing that 
decision, we should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state 
that the district court must expressly reference the prejudgment events at the probation 
disposition hearing in order for this standard of review to become applicable. To the 
contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge will automatically consider the 
prejudgment events when determining whether probation should be revoked. Thus the 
State's assertion that Mr. Brunet's argument that the court may have considered prior 
events is based on "gross speculation" illustrates that State's failure to comprehend the 
applicable standard of review. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7.) 
In Morgan, the Court of Appeals narrowed its Hanington holding. (Opinion, p.4.) 
The Court modified the standard, finding that it meant to indicate in Hanington that it 
would not "arbitrarily confine" itself to the facts that have arisen since the original 
sentencing hearing. Morgan, Opinion No. 38, p.4. The Morgan Court decided not to 
examine the "entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment 
... facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation" as required by Hanington, 148 
Idaho at 28. Rather the Court of Appeals concluded that the "focus of the inquiry is the 
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation" and, therefore, would 
"consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of 
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probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal." Morgan, 
Opinion No. 38, 
However, counsel has no real guidance in this appeal whether the requested 
transcripts will be deemed relevant by the Court reviewing the Appellant's Brief. While 
the Morgan opinion narrows the standard of review, all the prior proceedings are still 
deemed relevant. The Morgan opinion just holds that the prior proceedings are less 
relevant. However, there is no rule which controls how relevant a prior proceeding must 
be in order for a transcript of that proceeding to be deemed necessary for the appeal. If 
an issue on appeal is not addressed on the merits because counsel, in reliance on 
Morgan, decided to forgo the request for the transcripts, the appellant will lose his/her 
right to a meaningful appeal and counsel would be deemed ineffective because the 
missing transcripts would be presumed to support the district court's 
sentencing/probation decisions. 
The State also argues, in reliance on Morgan, that Mr. Brunet was not denied 
due process because he could have filed an objection to the record in order to get the 
request transcripts. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) In deciding whether Morgan's rights 
were violated, the Court of Appeals held that because he could have obtained the 
transcript without question during the objection to the record phase, he is precluded 
from arguing that his Due Process rights were violated because the Court is precluding 
him from augmenting the appellate record. Morgan, Opinion No. 38, p.5. However, this 
ignores the procedure the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted and made available to all 
appellants to obtain transcripts that are needed to complete the appellate record. See 
l.A.R. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 30 provides in part, 
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Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. Such a motion 
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for 
the request and attaching a copy of any document sought to be 
augmented to the original motion and to two copies of the motion which 
document must have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date 
of its filing, or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or 
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Any 
request for augmentation with a transcript that has yet to be transcribed 
must identify the name of the court reporter(s) along with the date and title 
of the proceedings(s), and an estimated number of pages, and must 
contain a certificate of service on the named reporter(s). 
Through this procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has allowed all parties to obtain 
transcripts that need to be a part of the appellate record. If one must have completed 
the appellate record by the time of the settlement stage under rule l.A.R. 28, then there 
would be absolutely no need to have Rule 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 30 is there to 
ensure every opportunity is given to provide a completed record to the appellate court. 
As recognized in State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 656 (Ct. App. 2004), the appellant could 
ask to complete the appellate record by filing a motion under l.A.R. 30 to augment the 
appellate record with the necessary missing transcripts. 
In sum, the Morgan opinion leaves appellate counsel guessing as to which 
transcripts will be needed to provide an adequate record to review 
sentencing/probationary decisions. Morgan still says the entire record is relevant for 
review of those issues, but the earlier proceedings are less relevant. Contrary to the 
State's position, it does not matter what the district court expressly stated at the rider 
review hearing because under the applicable standard of review an appellate court will 
assume the district court considered all of the prior proceedings and, therefore, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of those proceedings in order to 
ensure it is aware of the same information available to the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Brunet 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district 
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Brunet respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence. 
DATED this gth day of January, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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